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Municipal Infrastructure Funding Deficit in Ontario? 
 
Abstract 
In Canada, it is estimated that the total value of core municipal infrastructure is over $1.1 trillion dollars 
or about $80,000 per household.  Of this value one-third is in poor or very poor condition which 
increases the risk of service disruption.  Municipalities are struggling to fund these infrastructure 
renewal needs with limited revenue tools.  Property taxes remain the largest source of revenue for 
Canadian municipalities but are currently insufficient to meet their long-term needs. 
Municipalities in Ontario have been advocating for additional revenue tools to address this challenge.  
This paper uses a common set of evaluation criteria to analyze three potential revenue options to assist 
Ontario municipalities in funding their long-term infrastructure needs.  These include a 1% increase to 
the provincial portion of the HST, the uploading of the education tax to create local property tax room, 
and the sharing of cannabis excise tax revenues with municipalities.  The results of this analysis are 
compared to determine which of the proposed funding tools would best meet the needs of 
municipalities in addressing the infrastructure funding challenge. 
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Municipal infrastructure is a fundamental requirement for virtually every part of a citizen’s life in 
Canada.  Among other things it: 
• Enables the movement of people and goods, 
• Maintains our health by providing clean drinking water, removal of waste and opportunities for 
recreation;  
• Provides safety from flooding and other natural disasters.  
In Canada it is estimated that the total value of core municipal infrastructure is over $1.1 trillion dollars 
or about $80,000 per household.  Of this value, one-third is in poor or very poor condition which 
increases the risk of service disruption. (Canadian Infrastructure Report Card, 2016)  In fact, there are 
enough roads in Canada that are in poor condition to build a road almost halfway to the moon and one 
third of recreational or cultural facilities require investment in the next decade. Climate change puts an 
additional strain on aging infrastructure systems particularly those related to water, waste water and 
stormwater systems. (Canadian Infrastructure Report Card, 2019) 
Local governments across Canada are facing significant infrastructure funding deficits.  Without 
substantial increases in reinvestment rates, asset conditions will continue to decline resulting in more 
costly repair treatments and higher risk of asset failure.  (Canadian Infrastructure Report Card, 2016)  
Canada’s mounting urban infrastructure debt is evidence that the current revenue tools available to 
local governments are inadequate.  Canadian local governments exist within a highly regulated 
framework that restricts them from the use of many innovative tools. (Vander Ploeg C. , New Tools for 





The municipalities in Ontario have similar challenges to those of the rest of the country.  The current 
Municipal Act, 2001 restricts the types of revenue that can be generated by Ontario municipalities.  As a 
result, they rely heavily on property taxation to cover the cost of providing municipal services and 
investment in infrastructure renewal. Of every dollar of household taxation paid in Ontario, 
municipalities collect just nine cents (Johal & Alwani, 2019) yet are responsible for over 60% of Canada’s 
public infrastructure. (Hamm, 2018) Unlike their counterparts in the United States, opportunities to 
generate revenues from other sources such as local sales taxations are limited. However, a new Federal 
and Provincial revenue source has recently become available that could potentially be shared with 
municipalities to help them address this need. 
The production and sale of recreational cannabis was legalized in Canada on October 17, 2018.  Along 
with this legalization, the Federal and Provincial Governments began to impose taxation on its sale.  This 
represents a new source of revenue to the Federal and Provincial Governments but also results in 
increased costs, particularly at the municipal level for services such as licensing and enforcement.  
The Goal of this Research 
The aim of this paper is to investigate if the new taxation revenue generated from the legalization of 
cannabis in Canada presents a viable funding tool to address the municipal infrastructure challenge.  
This potential funding tool will be evaluated across a number of criteria by exploring a series of sub-
questions.   
These include: 
• Is the tax fair in terms of the benefits received?  Is there a strong link between the need for the 
taxation and the use of the funding? 





• Are the revenues sustainable, predictable and sufficient to meet the need?  
• Are the taxes visible, transparent and accountable? 
• Is there an ease of administration in passing this taxation revenue on to municipalities?  
These evaluation criteria are not unique. Similar criteria have been employed in the past by other 
researchers to evaluate a number of proposed alternative funding mechanisms.  In this way, the results 
of this research can be readily compared against past proposals to arrive at an appropriate 
recommendation. 
This inductive research aims to review the current infrastructure challenge facing municipalities in 
Ontario and compare 3 potential funding tool options to address the need:   
• Option 1 - a partial distribution of the new excise tax revenues generated from the legalization 
of cannabis to municipalities; 
• Option 2 - a 1% increase to the provincial portion of the HST; and 
• Option 3 - upload the education property tax to create local property tax room.  
By comparing these three proposed tools, this research aims to answer the question:  
“Which of the three proposed revenue tools is best suited to address the municipal infrastructure 
funding deficit in Ontario?” 
This research is focused on the Ontario context as sales tax rates and the funding of education from 
property taxes varies across the different provinces and territories within Canada.  As such, the 
evaluation may not be applicable within other jurisdictions.  Where appropriate, current practices from 





local governments that have greater funding options available to them including local sales taxes and 
other revenue sharing tools.  
While all three revenue tool options will be evaluated, greater background and trend forecasting will be 
provided for the recreational Cannabis tax sharing option.  The rationale being that as this relatively new 
source of taxation revenue in Canada, it has not benefited from the same volume of previous academic 
literature as it relates to potentials for municipal funding as the other two options presented.  
Understanding the Infrastructure Challenge 
Municipal infrastructure is a “key driver of productivity and growth in a modern economy, as a 
contributor to the health and well-being of Canadian citizens, and as a critical component of 
transporting goods and services across the country.” (Brodhead, Darling, & Mullin, 2014)  
Literature suggests a number of contributing factors to the infrastructure funding deficit.  Many of the 
major causes will be explored in the following sections including: 
• Aging infrastructure 
• Urbanization and Urban Sprawl Development 
• Overinvestment in Assets 
• Reductions in Senior Government Infrastructure Investments and Grant Programs 
• Downloading 
• Changing Infrastructure Standards and Increased Levels of Service 
• Failures in long-term planning 






The majority of Canadian public infrastructure was built between the Second World War and the late 
1970s as municipalities experienced a period of rapid growth and urbanization.  This means that a large 
amount of infrastructure has reached the end of its useful life.  Canadian municipalities have entered a 
wide scale rebuilding phase but lack the financial resources to do so.  It is estimated that almost 30% of 
Canadian infrastructure is over 80 years old while only 40% is under 40. (Vander Ploeg C. , New Tools for 
new times: a sourcebook for the financing, funding and delivery of urban infrastructure, 2006)  This 
older infrastructure is more costly to maintain and underinvestment in ongoing maintenance often 
results in much higher renewal costs. 
Urbanization and Urban Sprawl Development 
The bulk of the infrastructure existing in Canadian cities today was initially constructed by developers 
during the urbanization of Canada in the 1950s and 1960s.  As sprawling subdivisions were assumed by 
municipalities this new infrastructure came without initial cost.  Rather than setting aside the 
assessment growth revenues from the new development for the future renewal of these assets, 
municipalities instead invested in providing additional soft services to residents and kept property tax 
increases artificially low.  
Beginning in the mid 1940s, the rural edges of metropolitan areas in North America began to develop 
into residential subdivisions and commercial strip developments.   This urban sprawl development was 
characterized by “vast tracts of low-density, often isolated, 1-2 floor single-family homes” (Donnan, 
2008)  Initially municipalities welcomed this form of development as it brought with it increased 
employment and additional property taxes.  However, this style of development is inefficient from a 
public sector service delivery perspective. Single-family homes on large lots result in low population 





water, sewer, waste management, police, fire and recreation without significantly high property taxes 
when compared to compact urban development. 
Some of the problems with urban sprawl Donnan identified include “inefficiencies due to high costs of 
providing utilities, roads, highways and infrastructure to scattered, low density subdivisions and 
bedroom communities” as well as “generation of “fiscal deficits” and rapidly increasing taxes for 
jurisdictions where infrastructure capital and servicing operating costs exceed the development charges 
paid by developers and additional tax revenues paid by property owners” (Donnan, 2008) 
Overinvestment in Assets 
Large scale senior government grant programs have sometimes resulted in municipalities taking on 
additional infrastructure above what they would normally require or provide on their own.  Grant 
funded infrastructure such as recreation centres have been built in communities who do not have the 
sufficient tax base to efficiently support the ongoing operating and maintenance costs nor have the 
resources to reserve funding towards the long-term renewal of the facility. A full life-cycle cost analysis 
including future operating and maintenance costs have rarely been considered when municipalities are 
competing for limited grant funding. (Kitchen H. M., 2006) While municipalities have had to increase 
taxes to cover the ongoing operating costs of these facilities they often fail to set aside funding for 
future capital renewal and replacement. 
Additionally, grant funding can lead to situations where user fees are set artificially low and do not fully 
offset the true lifecycle cost of the supporting infrastructure.  As an example, when senior government 
grants provide funding to expand water treatment facilities, water rates may be set too low to recognize 
the true cost of providing the service.  This leads to inefficient cost management of the resource.  “All 
too often, inefficiently set user fees have led to overinvestment and larger facilities than would be 





Reductions in Senior Government Infrastructure Investments and Grant 
Programs 
In addition to the overinvestment in assets that can occur with senior government grants, there can also 
become an overreliance on the funding itself.  Following the economic recession of the early 1980s, the 
Federal and Provincial Governments began a period of fiscal restraint through the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  Capital grants that were previously available to fund major municipal infrastructure needs were 
significantly scaled back.  Total government spending on fixed capital formation measured as a 
percentage of GDP peaked in the mid-1960s at almost 5% but fell steadily to 2.1% by the late-1990s.  
While investment has increased since 2000 it has yet to reach historical levels. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 
2011) During this time municipalities had to become more reliant on their own sources of revenues to 
address infrastructure needs. (Vander Ploeg C. , New Tools for new times: a sourcebook for the 
financing, funding and delivery of urban infrastructure, 2006) 
 
Downloading 
The fiscal restraint programs by the Federal and Provincial governments of the late 1980s and early 
1990s also led to the downloading of hard infrastructure as well as many programs to the municipal 
level.  This downloading can be especially challenging for rural and Northern Ontario communities with 
high levels of infrastructure and social program costs but relatively small property tax bases.  As an 
example, the City of Kenora received a total of 18 downloaded bridges, 11 of which required immediate 
maintenance or replacement in excess of $20 million.  This placed an impossible financial burden on a 
community of 15,000 residents with an operating budget of just $25 million if funding was to be 
generated from the property tax alone. (Northwest Ontario Municipal Association, 2012) 
In additional to hard infrastructure, Ontario municipalities are partly responsible for provincial welfare 
programs and spend a large portion of their annual expenditures on social services such as social 





programs compete with property tax funding for infrastructure initiatives. This downloading of services 
to the local level has stretched resources too thin as municipalities have not been provided new sources 
of revenues to cover the additional costs. (Duffy, Royer, & Beresford, 2014) 
Changing Infrastructure Standards and Increased Levels of Service 
Standards and regulations for infrastructure and municipal services have changed significantly over 
time, particularly as they relate to health and safety and the environment. (Vander Ploeg C. , New Tools 
for new times: a sourcebook for the financing, funding and delivery of urban infrastructure, 2006)  These 
changes include legislation changes such as updates to the Building Code and requirements for AODA 
compliance, as well as a desire for municipalities to demonstrate environmental leadership by 
constructing new infrastructure to meet environmental standards such as LEED (Leadership in Energy 
and Environmental Design). As a result, infrastructure is not being replaced on a like-for-like basis as it is 
renewed.  Instead, higher quality materials are used and infrastructure is expanded to provide additional 
capacity, as well as, higher service levels.  This significantly increases renewal costs. 
Failures in Long-Term Planning 
In some municipalities long-term financial planning has taken a backseat to short-term projects or 
election promises to keep property taxes artificially low.  This can result in politicians supporting 
projects whose time horizons coincide with their terms in office rather than taking a long-term view of 
the municipal needs and fiscal realities of future generations. (Kitchen H. M., 2006) 
Interest Arbitration 
Interest arbitration in policing and fire service has increased the cost to deliver municipal services well 
beyond the rate of inflation and has led to higher property tax increases.  This competes with 
investments in infrastructure renewal.  The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) suggests this 





rather than looking at the municipal capacity to pay.  They determined that if fire and police had 
received the same increase as other municipal unions did between 2010 and 2014 it would have meant 
$485 million in savings to Ontario municipal governments.  This is the equivalent value of building 
roughly 1,750 kilometers of road which is the distance from Windsor to Montreal and back.  This value is 
more than four times that of the 2016 Ontario Community Infrastructure Fund. (Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario, 2017)   
Understanding the Funding Challenge  
Municipalities continue to take on ever increasing responsibilities with limited revenue generation 
options.  In 2015, AMO studied the fiscal situation faced by local governments in Ontario.  They 
concluded that municipalities are currently facing an estimated annual $4.9 billion shortfall each year for 
the next 10 years.  This estimated shortfall only accounts for the costs to maintain current service levels 
and finance infrastructure renewal and does not factor in any service level increases, additional new 
infrastructure or additional services downloaded from senior levels of government.  Should property 
taxes continue to be municipalities’ primary source of revenues, these would need to double by 2025.  
This would represent an 8.35% annual increase for the next decade.  Of this value 3.84% (46% or $2.25 
billion) would be required for infrastructure renewal alone. (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 
2015)  With these levels of required tax increases, attempting to close the infrastructure funding gap 
with increases to the property tax alone is both unrealistic and unsustainable. 
A key downfall of property tax is that its real per capita growth is well below the growth in other types 
of revenues which can be generated at the Federal and Provincial levels such as those tied to personal 
income and GDP. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)  For example, between 1961 and 2007 local taxes grew an 





tax averaged 10.2% annual growth in real per capita terms over the same period. (Vander Ploeg C. , 
Problematic property tax: why the property tax fails to measure up and what to do about it, 2008) 
Additionally, municipalities have taken on a number of non-traditional social service functions such as 
public health initiatives and immigration assistance or have strong income redistribution functions such 
as poverty mitigation and affordable housing.  These newer types of municipal functions are ill-suited to 
be funded from property taxes as the tax base is too narrow and they compete for funding allocations 
against infrastructure investment. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011) 
Lobbying for Funding Solutions 
The Municipal Act, 2001 restricts the sources of revenues available to municipalities in Ontario.  
Property tax remains the single largest source of revenues to deliver municipal services and fund 
expanded and renewed infrastructure.  In other jurisdictions such as the United States, many local 
governments have the ability to impose local sales and income taxes.  Organizations such as AMO and 
the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) have studied the infrastructure challenge facing 
municipalities and have lobbied provincial and federal governments for additional support. To date AMO 
has considered over 40 revenue options and assessed them against similar criteria to that used in this 
research. (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2017)  Some of these options include increased user 
fees, cost sharing of services, public private partnerships, local income taxes, an infrastructure bank and 
increased debt.  Of all of these options studied, AMO has concluded that a 1% increase to the provincial 
portion of the HST is their preferred recommendation. 
Previous Academic Research in this Area 
Countless articles have been written in the past 30 years which explore the infrastructure funding deficit 





evaluate the property tax against other sources of municipal funding yet draw differing conclusions on 
the effectiveness of property taxation. 
In her article “Municipal financing of capital infrastructure in North America”, Enid Slack evaluated a 
number of funding tools including property taxes, user fees, development charges, senior government 
grants, debt, tax increment financing and public-private partnerships. (Slack, 2005) Among her many 
findings she concluded that property tax is a good tax for local governments but that cities would 
benefit from having a greater mix of taxation options.   
The notion that municipalities require additional types of funding mechanisms was challenged by Bev 
Dahlby and Melville McMillian in their paper "Do Local Governments Need Alternative Sources of Tax 
Revenue? An Assessment of the Options for Alberta Cities." Using a similar research methodology to the 
work of Slack, the authors challenged the more widely accepted conclusion within the field of study that 
municipalities do require alternative funding sources if they are to generate sufficient revenues to meet 
their infrastructure funding challenges.  They assessed the appropriateness of property tax by examining 
and attempting to discredit, via data analysis, the arguments made by other researchers including: 
• That property tax is unresponsive to economic growth 
• That property tax is an inadequate source of municipal tax revenue 
• That the property tax burden is regressive 
• The property taxes inhibit economic growth and development 
The authors concluded that municipalities do not need alternative revenue sources but do recommend 
that provinces begin funding education costs from general revenues to leave the extra tax room for 





extensively within the research field which recommend the adoption of local or provincial sales taxes 
dedicated to infrastructure funding. 
Following the work of Dahlby and McMillian, Enid Slack worked alongside Harry Kitchen to publish their 
paper “New Tax Sources for Canada’s Largest Cities: What Are the Options?”.  In it they used a positivist 
research ontology approach and quantitative analysis to estimate and evaluate various types of taxation 
revenues for eight selected Canadian cities and compare those results against property taxation.  
These researchers were testing the hypothesis that property taxation was a better revenue tool than the 
other types of taxation evaluated. Their primary research question was “are some tax sources better 
than others for cities? How do we decide?” (Kitchen & Slack, 2016) After evaluating a number of 
taxation options for local governments they again concluded that a mix of tax options would be best.  A 
portfolio of taxes would allow cities to achieve revenue growth and revenue stability while ensuring 
fairness in the impact on taxpayers. (Kitchen & Slack, 2016) 
As research in this area has not yet landed on a definitive conclusion this demonstrates that further 
study of the topic is warranted. 
Evaluating the Proposed Revenue Sources 
In order to evaluate the different proposed funding tools, it is important to establish a common set of 
evaluation criteria.  In the past 30 years, numerous researchers including Slack, Kitchen, Vander Ploeg, 
Dahlby and McMillian have evaluated a significant number of proposed infrastructure funding solutions.  
From this work a number of common evaluation criteria have emerged which include: 
• Fairness – There is perceived equity in terms of the taxes paid by the residents and businesses in 
comparison to the benefits they received from local public services. All types of taxation are 





incentive to change their behaviour to avoid the tax. (Vander Ploeg C. , Problematic property 
tax: why the property tax fails to measure up and what to do about it, 2008) 
• Immobile tax base– If the tax base is unable to easily relocate then the tax will be borne by the 
local residents and businesses and not passed on to people living in other jurisdictions.   
• Sufficient, stable, and predictable revenues – the revenue generated for the local government 
can be reasonably counted upon.  The total dollars generated are sufficient to meet the 
identified gap or need.  For the purposes of this analysis the $2.25 billion annual infrastructure 
funding shortfall estimated by AMO will be used as the benchmark to determine if revenues are 
sufficient.  An annual value of $4.9 billion would be required to maintain current service levels 
and fund infrastructure needs. 
• Visible, transparent, and accountable – the tax is understood by residents so they can hold the 
government accountable.  Taxpayers are more likely to support a tax used for a purpose they 
value rather than paying a tax that disappears into the “black hole” of a general operating fund. 
(Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011) 
• Ease of administration – the tax is easy to administer and compliance costs are minimized. 
In the following sections, Cannabis taxation revenues will be evaluated against a proposed 1% sales tax 
and the uploading of education taxes to provide additional local property taxation room using these 
same criteria.  In this way the results can be readily compared and contrasted against other revenue 
tools thereby leveraging the work done previously by other researchers in this field of study. 
An outline of each of the proposed funding tools will be presented.  The funding tool will then be 
evaluated against the common set of evaluation criteria.  Finally, the results of each evaluation will be 





A New Opportunity – Cannabis Taxation  
On October 17, 2018, the production and sale of recreational cannabis was legalized in Canada.  As part 
of legalizing this trade, both the Federal and Provincial Governments began to impose taxation in the 
form of sales and excise taxes.  These taxes represent a new source of revenue at both the federal and 
provincial levels.  Municipalities also gained the ability to generate a modest revenue increase in areas 
such as business licensing.  However, with legalization, the municipal level faced increased costs for 
licensing and enforcement.  
Current Taxation Framework 
As part of the 2018 Federal budget, it was recognized that the cannabis excise tax would be shared on a 
75/25 basis with 75% of the duties being provided to provincial and territorial governments while the 
remaining 25% would remain with the Federal Government.   It was also agreed that the maximum 
annual funding taken by the Federal Government would not exceed $100 million with the excess being 
paid to the provinces and territories (Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, 2019). The 
Coordinated Cannabis Taxation Agreements between the Federal and Provincial / Territorial 
governments are in place for 2 years and will be reviewed in 2020. (Hartmann, 2018)  The agreement by 
the Federal Government to share a higher portion of excise tax revenues with the provinces and 
territories was premised on the basis that a significant portion of their share would be further 
distributed to local municipalities who bear the majority of costs related to legalization and 
enforcement. (Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, 2019)   
These agreements also specified that the combined rate of all federal, provincial and territorial 
cannabis-specific duties and taxes would not exceed the higher of $1 per gram, or 10% of a producer’s 
selling price. (Mancell, 2018)  The cannabis excise tax is a sin tax similar to that on tobacco, alcohol and 





final product, the capping of the duties and taxes was aimed at keeping the final price of legal cannabis 
competitive with the illegal market.   
In addition to the excise tax, recreational cannabis is subject to GST/HST/Provincial Sales Taxes where 
applicable.  The excise duties are included in the price on which the GST/HST/Provincial Sales Tax is 
calculated on the sale of the final product to consumers.  Manitoba imposes a mark-up on recreational 
cannabis but not PST while British Columbia imposes a mark-up and PST.  In addition, Health Canada 
extracts cost recovery fees from cannabis producers. (Mancell, 2018) 
All provinces and territories (with the exception of Manitoba which levies its own provincial tariffs) 
receive the basic provincial duty.  Some jurisdictions have further negotiated an adjustment to their 
portion of the duties to offset varying sales tax rates across the country in the form of a supplemental 
duty rate.  These provinces/territories receive the basic provincial duty plus the supplementary duty rate 
as follows: 
• Ontario: +3.9% of the base or dutiable amount; 
• Alberta: +16.8% of the base or dutiable amount; 
• Saskatchewan: +6.45% of the base or dutiable amount; 
• Nunavut: +19.3% of the base or dutiable amount. 
New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador have included the 
supplementary duty rate in their agreements but have currently set them to 0%. (Mancell, 2018) 
Temporary Revenues Sharing with Municipalities 
Each province is unique in how they regulate the industry and share taxation revenues if at all with the 
local level.  Currently only three provinces have executed short-term (2 year) funding agreements with 





revenue to municipalities over 2 years to assist them with “cannabis legalization implementation in their 
communities and ensure that municipal budgets are not unduly pressured by these activities”. 
(Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2019) Quebec took a similar approach whereby municipalities 
received $60 million over two years to cover new costs. (Hamm, 2018) In Alberta, the Municipal 
Cannabis Transition Program (MCTP) provided $11.2 million over two years to municipalities to assist 
municipalities with the challenges of legalization.  This grant was only available to municipalities with 
populations in excess of 5,000 and who were responsible for their own policing.  In all three provinces 
there has been no commitment to date for a long-term funding plan. (CBC, 2018)  
Revenue Trends and Forecasts 
To date cannabis revenues have fallen short of projections.  In the first year of legalization (2018/19) the 
federal government received just $18 million in cannabis revenues after originally projecting to earn $35 
million.  For the 2019/20 fiscal year, the government initially projected $100 million in revenues but has 
since amended this forecast to $66 million.  (Tumilty, 2020)  
There are a number of factors which have resulted in revenues falling short of projections including 
delayed physical retail locations and supply chain issues.   
Ontario, which has the largest market for cannabis, was slow to open retail stores.  The first retail 
locations opened in April of 2019 with just 25 stores across the province.  In June 2020, Ontario 
authorized its 100th retail location.  This is far below the 483 locations in Alberta (Lamers, Ontario 
cannabis market surpasses 100 retail store authorizations, 2020) and suggests there is sufficient room in 
the Ontario market to significantly expand the number of physical locations. 
Prior to the opening of physical locations, Ontario customers could only purchase legal cannabis online 
from the provincially run Ontario Cannabis Store (OCS).  Statistics Canada found that retail sales in 





other provinces. In New Brunswick, nearly 97% of sales take place in the province’s 20 physical locations 
rather than online. (Marijuana Business Daily, 2020)   
Supply issues have challenged other provinces.  Initially in Alberta and Quebec stores had to limit 
opening days because of supply shortages. (Tumilty, 2020)  This in turn drove consumers back to the 
illegal market. 
Cannabis revenues are forecasted to grow to $135 million in 2020/21 and steadily increase to $220 
million by 2023. (Tumilty, 2020)  These values represent only the federal taxes and do not include 
provincial revenues.   
Expanding the market with Cannabis 2.0 products such as such as edibles, extracts and topicals will 
further boost taxation revenues.  These products became legally available for sale in Ontario in January 
2020.  In the first month, the Ontario Cannabis Store generated $4.3 million in sales from these products 
with $3.77 million from the sale of vape products and $569,000 from the sale of edibles. (Subramaniam, 
2020) 
Market Trends and Forecasts 
Cannabis is one of the most widely used substances in Canada with almost half of Canadians reporting 
having used it at some point in their lives.  The National Cannabis Survey found that 16.8% of Canadians 
over the age of 15 reported using cannabis in the three months before being surveyed.  Of these 6% 
reported using cannabis daily or almost daily. (Rotermann, 2020) 
As of June, 2020, there were 962 retail locations across Canada.  This was an increase of 672 stores from 
the prior year. (Cannabis Benchmarks, 2020)  While the legal Canadian industry may have been slow to 
take off following legalization, it is growing and will continue to expand as new Cannabis 2.0 products 





The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Cannabis Sales 
Retail sales of cannabis in Canada fell just 0.6% from a record high of $181.1 million in March to $180.1 
million in April despite a non-cannabis retail sales decline of 26.4% for the same time period. Sales 
figures varied considerably across the country.  In Ontario where physical locations were forced to 
temporarily close as a result of the emergency orders, sales fell 9.6% and remained down during the 
period of time when online ordering and curbside pickup was allowed.  Once physical locations were 
able to reopen, sales rebounded in May. (Israel, 2020) By contrast, in Alberta where stores continued to 
be open, sales remained steady following an initial boost in March as customers horded cannabis. These 
results support the evidence that cannabis sales are highly corelated to the availability of physical retail 
locations.  
Retail Pricing, the Impact of Taxation, and Addressing the Black Market 
In June 2020, the Canada Cannabis Spot Index price including excise taxes was $6.40 per gram. 
(Cannabis Benchmarks, 2020)  The Ontario Cannabis Store (OCS) has found that 81% of the province’s 
cannabis supply continues to originate from illegal sources.  They attribute this problem to a continued 
lack of retail locations and the higher dry flower prices in the legal system.  From April 2019 to March 
2020 OCS found that legal dry flowers sold in retail locations were 27% more expensive than those from 
illegal sellers.  However, pricing from the OCS online store was just 4% above the illegal prices. (Cannabis 
Benchmarks, 2020) Similar examples of competition with the black market can be found across the 
country.   
In the Northwest Territories, legal cannabis products can currently be purchased online from the 
Northwest Territories Liquor and Cannabis Commission (NTLCC) or from 5 liquor stores distributed 
across the Territory. Retail prices there are some of the highest in Canada with average prices at $10.65 





cannabis products by 10% in an effort to compete against illegal cannabis sales. (Marijuana Business 
Daily, 2020) 
In New Brunswick, the provincial cannabis retailer Cannabis NB, has also attempted to keep legal retail 
prices competitive with the illegal market. They have renegotiated purchase contracts with suppliers 
which were then passed on to customers in the form of lower retail prices.  This resulted in a 16% 
increase in 2020 second quarter sales over the prior period. (Marijuana Business Daily, 2020) 
Keeping the retail price of legal products at or near that of the black market is necessary to shift 
consumers purchasing behaviours towards legal channels where the product is subject to regulation and 
oversight.   To maintain the profitability of legally produced and distributed product it is important that 
the government-imposed sales and excise taxes are kept relatively low.  This impacts the revenue 
generating capability of the taxes. 
The Costs of Legalization 
Legalization of recreational cannabis brought with it a change in costs borne between the Federal 
Government, Provinces and Municipalities.     
Currently the federal government shares 75% of excise tax revenues with the provinces.  Erich Hartmann 
argues that “the sharing of the revenues from the excise tax should be informed by the relative 
cannabis-related costs each level of government carries”. (Hartmann, 2018)  Prior to legalization, 
Hartmann reviewed the estimated before and after costs associated with cannabis enforcement 
between the three governing bodies to determine if the current revenue sharing model would continue 
to reflect these costs in the future.  He found that post legalization, some costs were anticipated to 





Municipalities would realize increased costs to update and enforce zoning and building codes, enforce 
smoking restrictions, and advise in retail locations and business licensing.  Additionally, local public 
health units would incur costs associated with public education campaigns outlining the health risks of 
cannabis use. 
Hartmann identified that the largest cost decrease was forecasted in the criminal justice system.  
Policing, court and corrections costs would all be likely to decline with municipalities being the primary 
beneficiary of these cost savings.   Hartmann found that prior to legalization, possession offences were 
responsible for 60 percent of cannabis-related criminal justice costs.  These savings would be partially 
offset by anticipated increased costs related to a rise in cannabis-impaired driving offences.   
While Hartmann’s research suggested municipal cost savings would be realized this has yet to 
materialize.  When cannabis was first legalized, the City of Edmonton estimated it would cost an 
additional $4.3 million per year to cover the costs of police training and equipment, bylaw enforcement 
and rezoning work required to allow cannabis retailers to operate. (CBC, 2018)  Similarly, Regina 
estimated that the additional policing costs following legalization would be between $1.2 and $1.8 
million per year.  The Federation of Canadian Municipalities calculated that the annual costs related to 
cannabis legalization for municipalities to be between $3 million to $4.75 million per 500,000 residents.  
This equates to $6 to $9.50 per resident. (Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, 2019)   
In the year following legalization, the City of Calgary incurred $10.3 million of additional costs yet 
received just $3.84 million in one-time funding from the provincial Municipal Cannabis Transition 
Program. (Huges, 2019)  Similarly, the Union of B.C. Municipalities surveyed its members and found that 
over three years (2018-2020) 34 British Columbia municipalities estimated they would incur an 
additional $15.2 million in capital and operating costs with policing costs representing 33 percent of all 





million per year in incremental costs due to cannabis legalization. (Saltman, 2019)  Unlike Alberta, B.C. 
has not yet provided any transitional funding to municipalities to offset the increased costs.   
The long-term financial impacts of cannabis legalization on municipalities remains unclear. 
Municipalities consistently report policing costs as the largest incremental expenditure increase since 
legalization.  With the decriminalization of marijuana possession, criminal justice costs should decrease 
over time.  It is difficult to determine how other cannabis related offences will impact policing costs.   
In the United States, researchers at Washington State University found that there was virtually no 
statistically significant long-term effects of recreational marijuana legalization or retail sales on violent 
or property crime rates in that state. However, police officials have reported a significant increase in 
marijuana-related driving under the influence charges. (Decker & Smay, 2020)  In Canada, the National 
Cannabis Survey found that the reported likelihood of driving after cannabis use did not change 
following legalization. (Rotermann, 2020).  While the rate of cannabis impaired driving may not be 
changing post legalization, the frequency of roadside impairment testing will likely increase as 
municipalities strive to maintain public safety on local roadways.  This leads to increased costs as oral 
fluid testing devices used to detect the presence of THC cost between $20 to $40 each significantly 
above the cost of disposable mouthpieces used on breathalyzers which cost several cents each. (Cullen, 
2017) 
Revenue Sharing in Other Jurisdictions 
In the United States there are states where cannabis has been legalized and that share a portion of 
taxation with the local level of governments, as well as, allow local sales taxes.  Colorado and 
Washington became the first states in the United States to legalize recreational cannabis in 2012. Their 





State of Colorado 
Colorado has been collecting cannabis taxation revenues since 2014.  While the largest portion of 
revenues go to fund health care, health education and substance abuse programs, a portion is directed 
to other government programs including public schools.    
When first legalized, cannabis was subject to a recreational marijuana tax rate of 10%.  This was 
increased to 15% in 2017.  Of the 15% special sales tax collected, 10% of revenues are distributed 
directly to local governments.  (Colorado Office of State Planning & Budgeting, 2019) In addition, the 
product is subject to a 15% excise tax which is paid each time the product is transferred from a 
production facility to a dispensary.  It is also subject to a 2.9% state sales tax.  Finally, it can be further 
subjected to local taxes which vary depending on the district in which it is sold.  For example, in Denver 
an additional 1% sales tax is added which supports the Regional Transportation District and the Scientific 
and Cultural Facilities District. In other areas of the state, these local taxes fund initiatives such as the 
Aurora Day Centre, a place for the area’s homeless to spend the day.  In Colorado there are no limits 
placed on the taxes that can be levied locally. (Awad, 2018) At the state level revenues are used to 
support a variety of programs including capital investments in public education facilities. 
State of Washington 
In Washington State, the excise tax is 37% which is paid by consumers at the time of purchase.  In fiscal 
year 2019, the State collected a total of $395.5 million in marijuana income and license fees.  Of this 
total, 98.7% came from the state’s excise or sales tax.  State marijuana revenues exceeded those of 
liquor by $172 million and grew by $28 million over the prior year. (Davidson, 2020)  While these figures 
appear high, marijuana-based taxes account for just 1.5% of all of State’s revenues.  Of the nearly $400 
million collected in 2019, 50% was used to assist under-insured low-income residents pay for healthcare, 





programs to reduce the drop-out rate, 3% funded education and research initiatives, leaving just 4% to 
be distributed to cities and counties. (Decker & Smay, 2020) 
Option 1 – Distribution of Cannabis Revenues to Municipalities 
Under this proposed option, the Federal government would continue to collect the excise tax and retain 
25% of proceeds to a maximum of $100 million a year while distributing the remaining 75% to the 
Provinces and Territories.  Of the total funding received by the Province of Ontario, 50% would then be 
shared with local municipalities.  The funding would be granted to municipalities under long-term 
funding agreements, preferably 10 years or more, which would provide municipalities with longer term 
financial certainty and security. The use of the funding would be unrestricted thereby allowing 
municipalities to apply the annual grant to their area of greatest need.  Those municipalities facing 
increased enforcement and compliance costs could direct the funding to offset these increased 
expenses while other municipalities may choose to apply the funding to address other needs such as 
infrastructure.  
The province would apply their 50% share of the funding to a number of areas such as those which 
address any additional healthcare and social costs realized as a result of legalization.  This may include 
providing additional funding to public health units to increase public education and awareness 
campaigns, substance abuse, and research programs. 
Fairness 
Taxation is considered fair when there is perceived equity in terms of the taxes paid by the residents and 
businesses in comparison to the benefits they receive.  In the case of the excise tax paid by producers 
and incorporated into the final sale price of cannabis products there is little connection to spending on 
municipal infrastructure needs.  The industry is likely to support paying this excise tax to cover the 





away from the black market.  Using the funds for other purposes, especially those as unrelated as 
municipal infrastructure would face considerable resistance.  In particular the industry would push back 
against any increase in the existing excise tax as this would either erode profitability or drive the current 
retail price even higher than illegal sources. 
Immobile Tax Base 
Under the current taxation framework in Canada, a licensed cannabis producer pays a federal excise 
duty which is roughly $1 per gram when the cannabis products are delivered to a purchaser.  This 
purchaser may include a provincially-authorized distributor, a retailer or a final consumer.  In Canada, 
final consumers are responsible for paying the applicable GST/HST depending on the province or 
territory where the product is purchased.  In Ontario this would result in a 13% HST added to the final 
sale price of the product. (Government of Canada, 2020) As the sales taxation framework is uniform 
across the province and the excise tax is uniform across the country there is little incentive for 
consumers to go outside the jurisdiction to avoid the charges. 
While a consumer may have little incentive to leave the physical jurisdiction to avoid the tax, the ready 
supply of illegal sources makes it relatively easy to avoid the taxation.  Any increase to the current 
taxation raises the final sale price of the product and provides further incentive for consumers to seek 
out illicit sources. 
Sufficient, Stable, and Predictable Revenues 
While revenues fell far short of initial projections in the first year of legalization, the industry is growing.  
This can be seen in the large number of stores now open across the country.  Ontario has now opened 
its 100th store and is projected to reach 150 total retail locations by the end of 2020.  Cannabis 2.0 
products generated $4.3 million in sales during the first month of legal sales in Ontario.  The Federal 





they are far below the magnitude required to address the $2.25 billion annual infrastructure funding 
deficit in Ontario.  In addition, the government is reluctant to increase the excise tax any further as it will 
raise the retail price of legal cannabis products even higher than illicit sources. 
Visible, Transparent, and Accountable 
The cannabis producer is responsible for paying the excise tax to the Federal Government.  It then 
becomes a part of the final consumer retail price which is then subjected to HST in Ontario.  As the 
excise tax forms part of the retail price of the product it lacks transparency to the final consumer.  
Similar to the Federal and Provincial gas taxes, the end consumer makes little connection between the 
retail price of fuel and the underlying taxes contributing to the end price.  
Ease of Administration 
The excise tax is currently collected by the Federal Government and then proportionately shared with 
the Provinces and Territories.  To further distribute this revenue to the municipalities, the Province of 
Ontario would likely provide a grant program to local municipalities.  There are a number of options of 
how this money could be shared across the various municipalities.  Some of these options may include 
distribution based on population, number of retail cannabis locations or producers, reported 
incremental enforcement costs, value of municipal infrastructure, or any combination of factors.  While 
the Province has many existing grant programs in place to transfer funding to municipalities, the largest 
challenge will be in determining which funding allocation method provides the fairest distribution to the 
local level.  Determining a fair allocation method should be done in consultation with existing advocacy 
organizations such as AMO. 
Option 2 - 1% Increase in the Provincial Portion of the HST 
For many years AMO has been lobbying the Government of Ontario for more diversified municipal 





tax would be administered by adding 1% to the existing 8% provincial portion of the Harmonized Sales 
Tax (HST) in Ontario.  The Province of Ontario would then distribute the funding to local governments 
using a predetermined formula. 
This increase to the HST would help to manage the pressure on the property tax and fix the chronic 
under-investment in municipal infrastructure in the province. (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 
2017).  Based on AMO’s calculations a 1% sales tax would generate $2.7 billion annually less an 
adjustment of 2% to reflect collection costs and $166.5 million in sales tax credits for residents with 
incomes below the Low-Income Cut-off (LICO).  This results in net annual proceeds of $2.47 billion for 
municipalities in Ontario. (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2017)  By comparison, the Federal 
Gas Tax provided $819.4 million in funding to Ontario municipalities in 2018/2019. (Government of 
Canada, 2020)  
While a local sales tax may be a relatively new idea in Canada there are many jurisdictions in the world 
which permit it.  In the United States there are currently 25 states which permit a local sales tax of at 
least 1%. (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2017). These local sales taxes are generally referred 
to as the “local option sales tax” but since the tax rate is often fixed and capped at one cent per dollar 
subjected to tax it is more commonly known as the “penny tax”. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011) In the United 
States approximately 12% of all local government tax revenues come from a form of local sales tax. 
(Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011) 
Fairness 
Currently in Canada, urban population growth is occurring in suburb municipalities located just outside 
of major anchor cities with the suburban residents relying upon the large cities for much of their major 
infrastructure needs.  While the growth just outside of the anchor city’s municipal boundaries may 





C. G., 2011)  The implementation of a province-wide sales tax increase would help to ensure that those 
coming into a city to use its services and infrastructure help to pay for a portion of it.  This would result 
in a stronger link between those who consume the service and those who pay for it. 
In addition, unlike residential property tax which does not relate to ability to pay, or to business and 
commercial property taxes which do not relate to profits, a sales tax targets consumption.  This is a far 
more appropriate proxy for ability to pay. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011) 
Immobile Tax Base 
Sales taxes employed at the local level run the risk of producing economic distortions by shifting retail 
sales activities and consumer behaviour from one region to another. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)  
However, should the 1% sales tax be imposed at the provincial level as part of the HST, this impact 
would be minimized. 
In Canada sales tax rates vary across the country.  Increasing Ontario’s current 13% HST to 14% would 
not raise the rate to the highest level in Canada.  Currently all provinces east of Ontario have rates a 15% 
while those provinces west of Ontario are 13% or below.   
The following table outlines the current applicable sales tax rates in Canada: 
Province / Territory Rate 
Prince Edward Island 15% 
Nova Scotia 15% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 15% 














Sufficient, Stable, and Predictable Revenues 
Unlike the property tax, growth in sales tax revenue does not have to be achieved by increasing the 
rates each year.  A sales tax grows from increases in population and is tied to the performance of the 
economy as a whole. It also captures the effects of inflation. A downturn in the economy will reduce 
overall revenues while economic growth with increase it. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)  
The addition of the 1% tax to the existing HST would provide for a very broad tax base.  Unlike a 
property tax which reflects only one aspect of the economy (real estate) a sale tax generates revenues 
across a broad range of goods and services. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)  
AMO has estimated the net annual revenue generated from this proposal at $2.47 billion which is 
sufficient to fully fund the estimated $2.25 billion annual infrastructure investment shortfall. 
Visible, Transparent, and Accountable 
One way to ensure transparency is to earmark any form of new tax revenues specifically for 
infrastructure.  Earmarking refers to the practice of legislatively assigning revenue from a tax source to 
funding a specific expenditure.  By earmarking the funds towards local infrastructure it shields the 
revenues from political pressures that might attempt to divert the revenue elsewhere and results in 
increased accountability as there is a clear connection between the revenue and the expenditure. 
(Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)  With the blending of the additional 1% into the existing HST any earmarking 
of this funding would become less transparent to the taxpayer.   
Ease of Administration 
Under AMO’s proposal the 1% municipal sales tax would be added to the 8% provincial portion of the 
HST.  This would require consent from the Province but changes to the provincial rate does not require 
Federal approval.  Combining the tax within the existing HST eliminates the need to build and maintain 





The federal government administratively collects the HST and distributes the provincial portion back to 
each province based on their sales tax rates.  Once the provincial government receives their distribution, 
they could further distribute the 1% portion back to the municipalities with the assistance of AMO in a 
similar fashion to the current distribution of gas taxes or other grant programs using a predetermined 
funding formula.  Determining a fair funding formula may be one of the greatest challenges and would 
likely require the consultation of organizations such as AMO.  Options for distribution may be based on 
population, sales tax revenues by municipality, value of municipal infrastructure, or some combination 
of a number of criteria.  Further complications of calculating this funding formula would arise in two-tier 
municipalities where the relative distribution of infrastructure need is not equally weighted between the 
upper and lower tier governments.  
While AMO has not recommended a final allocation method, they have calculated the effects of a per 
household formula based on a sliding scale.  For households located within a two-tier municipality, the 
current share of upper tier revenue was used as the basis for sharing the revenues.  AMO believes this 
methodology reflects the service role that households (both permanent and seasonal) place on 
municipal governments and acknowledges economies of scale for municipalities of different sizes.  This 
methodology would allocate 45% of revenues to municipalities within the Greater Toronto and Hamilton 
Area (GTHA) and 55% to municipalities in the balance of the province. (Association of Municipalities of 
Ontario, 2017)  
Option 3 - Uploading of the Education Tax to Create Local 
Property Tax Room 
In Ontario, The Ministry of Education determines the total funding for each school board based on a 
funding formula.  A portion of the total funding comes from property taxes while the remainder comes 





education portion of property taxes for the school boards in their communities using a uniform rate set 
by the Province based on a current value assessment system. In the 2019-20 fiscal year, municipalities 
provided $7.2 billion of funding to school boards from the education property tax. (Financial 
Accountability Office of Ontario, 2019)  As both the province and the municipalities levy property taxes 
there is a form of fiscal spillover effect that arises from this joint occupancy of the tax field.  Higher 
property taxes levied by one government has the effect of reducing the taxing capacity of the other 
level. (Mintz & Roberts, 2006) 
To meet the long-term infrastructure funding requirements identified by AMO, the Province would need 
to shift $2.25 billion of the $7.2 billion of funding currently provided by the education property tax to 
general funds.  Local governments could then use the vacated tax space to increase their own property 
taxes and earmark the increased funding to infrastructure.  This change would have no direct impact to 
final property tax bills but would provide municipalities with the funding needed to address the 
infrastructure challenge.   If the Province were to shift a total of $4.9 billion it would also allow 
municipalities to maintain current service levels without the need for annual property tax increases for 
the next 10 years. 
This type of tax shift is not without precedent.  Prior to 2007, municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area 
(GTA) were required to “pool” tax assessment resources and redistribute the resulting revenues in a way 
that recognized the additional social services costs borne by that city.  Beginning in 2007, the Province 
began to phase out the GTA pooling transfers and replace them instead with a provincial grant to 
Toronto. (Fenn & Cote, 2015)  Many municipalities that benefited from the resulting tax shift maintained 
current property tax rates and used the newly created funding room to increase infrastructure 
investment.  In Halton Region alone this equated to an additional $41 million of annual infrastructure 





As this option does not impose a new form of taxation the shifting $2.25 billion the education funding 
away from property taxes would require the provincial government to fund this cost from other general 
funds.  To accomplish this the province would need to cut funding to other programs or continue to run 
higher deficits. 
Fairness 
Property taxes have a long history in funding local government needs and traditionally have been well 
supported for the purposes behind the tax. There is a strong connection between the services funded by 
property taxes at the local level and property values.  In this way the property tax is like a benefit tax as 
it approximates the benefits received by properties from local services.  Local residents who enjoy the 
benefits from services are required to pay for them. (Slack, 2005)  Residents feel they are receiving a 
good value proposition in that the majority of services funded by property taxes increase the overall 
value of their property.  In this way property owners are paying for the very services that increase the 
value of their properties. (Vander Ploeg C. , Problematic property tax: why the property tax fails to 
measure up and what to do about it, 2008)   
The challenge is that not all municipal services directly benefit properties equally.  Strong connections 
can be made between increased property values and a recently paved road, clean running water and a 
nearby park.  However, this connection weakens as property taxes are used to fund “people” services 
such as community welfare systems, public health initiatives and recreational services as opposed to 
“property” services. 
Unfortunately, some infrastructure demands arise from people who do not contribute to the property 
tax of the local municipality such as commuters, business travellers and tourists.  As a result, property 





Immobile Tax Base 
Because property tax is levied against real property it is largely immobile.  It can not move location in 
response to the tax.  As such this makes it easy to collect. (Slack, 2005)  However, real property can not 
be considered completely immobile.  While land is certainly immobile, improvements to the land and 
personal property are less so.  One must also consider that the people who own the property and are 
responsible for paying the taxes are quite mobile.  Rising property taxes in one location may encourage 
the movement of people to lower taxed areas.  This is particularly the case in city-regions that are highly 
fragmented – places surrounded by other municipalities that may offer similar services at a lower tax 
point.  In such cases the tax base remains but the people paying the taxes leave. (Vander Ploeg C. , 
Problematic property tax: why the property tax fails to measure up and what to do about it, 2008)  
While the property tax base may be considered immobile in the short-term, this becomes less so over 
the medium to long-term.  
Sufficient, Stable, and Predictable Revenues 
As the property tax is a relatively broad-based tax, it has the ability of generating significant revenue 
while employing relatively low tax rates.  Property taxes and property related taxes currently generate 
over 60% of own-source revenue and over 50% of total revenue of Canadian Municipalities. (Dahlby & 
McMillan, 2014)  However, the property tax often does not meet the needs of municipalities that have 
high infrastructure needs but relatively low property tax bases as can be found in many rural and 
Northern Ontario communities. 
Property tax is also an inelastic source of revenue in that it does not increase automatically and 
proportionately in response to economic growth.  Moreover, the need for infrastructure is often tied to 
economic and population growth while the property tax increases only marginally with growth. (Vander 





Infrastructure required for a growing municipality is often required in advance of when the property tax 
revenues are generated from that growth.  This can be problematic for municipal cashflows. 
Visible, Transparent, and Accountable 
Unlike income taxes which are withheld at source, the property tax is highly visible.  This visibility makes 
local governments accountable but also makes it difficult to increase the tax rate without residential 
pushback. (Slack, 2005) Since municipalities are not permitted to budget a deficit, determining the 
property tax rate is often the last step in municipal budgeting.  The property tax levy and resulting tax 
rate must make up the residual between planned expenditures and planned other sources of revenues 
such as user fees and grants.  As a result, it changes annually. In contrast, federal and provincial 
governments set their tax rates such as those for personal and corporate income and sales taxes and 
change them infrequently. (Dahlby & McMillan, 2014) 
Ease of Administration 
Local property taxes are often more costly to administer than other potential forms of local taxation 
such as income, sales and fuel taxes which could be piggy-backed onto existing provincial taxes. (Kitchen 
& Slack, 2016)  However, municipalities already have the levying and collection mechanisms in place so 
shifting the proportionate collection of taxes between local and education rates would not have a long-
term impact to administrative costs.  
Comparing the Results 
The following section will compare each of the funding options against the evaluation criteria. 
Fairness 
A tax can be considered fair when there is a sense of equity between taxes paid in comparison to the 
benefits received.  In so far as funding hard infrastructure is concerned, there is a strong connection 





While property taxes can be criticized for being unfair in that they do not reflect an individual’s ability to 
pay, a sales tax targets consumption.  In this way a sales tax is a far more appropriate proxy for ability to 
pay. 
The excise tax paid by cannabis producers and incorporated into the final sale price of cannabis products 
has little connection to spending on municipal infrastructure needs.  Using this funding for such a 
disconnected service would be met with considerable resistance.  There would be far greater industry 
support for using the excise tax revenues to fund the increased costs associated with legalization and 
initiatives to eliminate the cannabis black market. 
Immobile Tax Base 
In the short-term property taxes have a very immobile tax base.  However, over time there is a 
possibility that residents may move away from areas of higher taxation to municipalities offering similar 
services at a lower cost. 
As the 1% HST would be administered at the provincial level there is little incentive to shift consumer 
behaviour in response to the increase in the tax rate.  Provinces to the east of Ontario would still have a 
higher sales tax rate (15% vs 14%) and Manitoba to the west would be only marginally below (13% vs 
14%).  This 1% savings would not contribute to significant cross-border shopping patterns especially 
considering the remoteness and size of communities along the Ontario/Manitoba border. 
The cannabis excise taxes are administered on a Federal level and therefore have an immobile tax base.  
However, any increases to the excise tax rate would increase the final sales price of the end product and 





Sufficient, Stable, and Predictable Revenues 
The revenue generating capabilities from cannabis revenues fall far short of the level of funding required 
to address the infrastructure funding gap, regardless of the percentage shared with local municipalities.  
In addition, there is little incentive to increase the excise tax rate as this would drive consumers towards 
illicit sources of cannabis products. 
Both the sales tax and property tax shift have the potential to generate sufficient funding to address the 
$2.25 billion infrastructure funding deficit identified by AMO.  However, regions with high infrastructure 
needs and low property tax bases may be challenged to raise the funds from property taxes alone.  In 
this way, the sales tax offers redistributive powers not available to the property tax.   
The effectiveness of this redistributive power would be subject to how the end funding formula is 
developed by the Province. In the sample household-based allocation methodology calculated by AMO, 
45% of sales tax revenues would be provided to GTHA municipalities with 55% provided to the balance 
of municipalities in the province.  Many other methodologies are possible, each with their own ability to 
redistribute the revenues across the province. 
Finally, unlike the property tax, growth in sales tax revenue does not have to be achieved by increasing 
the rates each year.  A sales tax grows from increases in population and is tied to the performance of the 
economy as a whole. 
Visible, Transparent, and Accountable 
The regular requirement to change the property tax rate make it by far the most visible, transparent and 
accountable of the proposed funding tools.  This visibility improves accountability which helps residents 
relate the services that they receive to the costs of the taxes that they pay. (Mintz & Roberts, 2006)  At 
the same time this visibility is a key reason why Councils are reluctant to increase the rate to the degree 
required to fund the infrastructure need.  By shifting the cost of education off the property tax base, 






The 1% sales tax is visible to the taxpayer as it is added on top of the final sale price of purchased goods.  
However, earmarking 1% of the sales tax to municipal infrastructure needs would become less 
transparent over time as the value is blended into the total tax rate. 
 The cannabis excise tax is the least visible of the options to the end taxpayer.  As this taxation is paid by 
cannabis producers it forms a part of the sales price of the final product.  In this way it is similar to fuel 
taxes in that many final consumers fail to realize how much the tax contributes to the retail price of the 
product. 
Ease of Administration 
Unlike the other two options presented, increasing local property tax rates would not require the 
Province to develop what has the potential of being a highly contentious funding formula to distribute 
either the sales tax or cannabis grants to the local level. As such this option is likely to be the easiest to 
implement and would not result in additional long-term administrative costs. 
Summary 
The following table summarized how the funding options address the evaluation criteria.  A checkmark 
indicates the criteria is partially met while two checkmarks indicate the criteria is largely met. 
 
Criteria Cannabis Taxes 1% Sales Tax Education Upload 
Fairness    
Immobile Tax Base    
Sufficient, Stable, 
Predictable Revenues 
   
Visible, Transparent, 
Accountable 
   





Cannabis taxes lack transparency, have little connection to municipal infrastructure needs and generate 
insufficient revenues to address the infrastructure funding deficit. There is also the potential for 
consumers to shift purchases to the black market in response to any increase in the excise tax paid as 
part of the retail sales price of cannabis products. 
The 1% sales tax generates sufficient revenues to address the issue and has a broad tax base.  The 
revenues would increase as the economy grows.  While the public would resist any increase to the HST, 
the resulting 14% sales tax rate would remain below the highest rates charged in Canada.  This option 
has a high redistribution ability to areas of the province with the greatest need. 
Of all of the options presented, property tax has the highest connection to infrastructure and is the most 
transparent.  As such taxpayers will view it as fair.  Unfortunately, the property tax does not address two 
key issues.  Firstly, it does not solve the spillover effects of non-residents using local services.  Secondly, 
it is raised locally so does not have the same redistribution potential as a province wide sale tax.  This 
option generates sufficient revenues to address the problem but would require the province to find 
alternative sources from which to fund education. 
Recommendation 
The aim of this research was to evaluate which of the three proposed revenue tools was best suited to 
address the municipal infrastructure funding deficit in Ontario.  After evaluating the three options 
against a common set of evaluation criteria it is recommended that the provincial portion of the HST in 
Ontario be increased by 1%.  The estimated $2.47 billion of additional revenues generated from this 
increase should then be redistributed to local governments as a new source of funding to address 
infrastructure challenges. 
This option provides a new diversified funding source for municipalities and has an ability to redistribute 





challenges.  This redistribution power is not possible with property tax based revenues and the cannabis 
excise taxes are insufficient to meet the infrastructure needs. 
Conclusion 
Municipalities in Canada require additional revenue sources if they are to make meaningful progress on 
addressing the infrastructure funding deficit.   
No single tax is a perfect solution.  None are entirely fair or neutral with regards to investment patterns 
or economic distortions.  At the same time, no single tax is equally suited to generate predictable, stable 
and growing revenue streams.  A single tax source can not perfectly compensate for inflation, local 
economy growth, or free-riding that results from non-residents using local infrastructure. (Vander Ploeg 
C. G., 2011)  The infrastructure challenge facing municipalities in Ontario has arisen from a large number 
of challenges and will require a large number of solutions if it is to be adequately addressed.  There is no 
silver bullet. 
Diversifying revenues with the introduction of a sales tax dedicated to municipal infrastructure needs is 
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